The Purcell Principle Needs to Be Reined in and David Gans Has the Goods

I’ve been quite critical of the Purcell Principle, most comprehensively in this piece, Reining in the Purcell Principle. Since I wrote that article, the Court has only made things worse.

David Gans, in this careful ACS issue brief, brings this research up to date and makes a strong case:

Purcell should be reconsidered. Through a series of orders that either offer no reasoning or simply rely on Purcell and its progeny, the Court has effectively displaced a long line of prior precedents that recognized the judiciary’s obligation to enforce the Constitution and voting rights laws, while also placing limits on the scope of remedies consistent with long-standing equitable principles. Reconsidering the Purcell principle would not mean courts would grant injunctive relief across the board. Rather in line with Reynolds and other cases, the Court would consider longstanding equitable principles, which require consideration of the likelihood of
success on the merits, the balance of hardships, and the public interest, including the interest in the orderly administration of the election.74 As Reynolds laid out, “[i]n awarding or withholding immediate relief, a court is entitled to and should consider the proximity of a forthcoming election and the mechanics and complexities of state election laws, and should act and rely upon general equitable principles. With respect to the timing of relief, a court can reasonably endeavor to avoid a disruption of the election process which might result from requiring precipitate changes that could make unreasonable or embarrassing demands on a State in adjusting to the requirements of the court’s decree.”75

74 See Hasen, Reining in the Purcell Principle, supra note 12, at 444 (“[T]he Supreme Court should adjudicate its election disputes consistent with the general standards and levels of deference it has established for considering non-election requests to stay a lower court order, vacate a lower court stay, or issue an injunction in its own right. Special considerations related to elections should be one, but not a dominating, factor.”).


75 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 585.

Share this: